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3Abstract
This paper addresses the debt increase problem within the European Union from the beginning of
2000s to the present day and the subsequent debt restructuring process achieved by different fiscal
rules. It will be econometrically proved the positive impact of fiscal rules on the public debt of a EU
member country. The methodology used in this paper refers to the “Fiscal Rule Index” designed by
the European Commission and is applied to the EU countries.
41. Introduction
The debt problem came to light in 2002 when Excessive deficit procedures (EDP) were opened for
Portugal, Germany and France and in the following years for Netherlands, Greece and Italy. After the
closure of these EDP, in 2008 the debt level in Europe increased considerably as a consequence of the
great economic recession following the financial crisis. As will be shown in the second chapter of this
paper (Chapter 2.1), the debt increase trend affects the whole of Europe, in particular the eurozone
debt average becomes equal to 88% GDP, considerably surpassing the 60% GDP established by the
Maastricht criteria. Moreover we will analyse the structural and primary deficit changes during the
period prior to and following the crisis in order to examine its impact on governmental debt (Chapter
2.2). Disassociating from the 2008's financial crisis, this study analyses the main economic and
political causes behind a debt accumulation (Chapter 2.3). Economic variables like the increase of
interest payment on debt, the diminution of GDP growth rate, the previously greater debt level and a
negative primary budget balance over GDP are responsible for the boost of governmental debt-to-GDP
ratio. Furthermore political factors like government's fragmentation (multiparty government coalition)
and political instability create excessive deficits and debt (Roubini et al., 1989; Persoon et al. 2007).
This deficit and debt accumulation creates sustainability problems such that higher primary surpluses
are required for paying back debt and its interest rate. As we will see in the Chapter 2.4, the IMF has
implemented a Debt sustainability analysis (DSA) in order to assess countries' sustainability. Several
european countries, like Italy and Greece, surpass the 60% GDP threshold imposed by Maastricht
criteria, yet have a sustainable debt in the sense of the IMF study (IMF, 2013). 
After having treated the problem of debt accumulation, the third Chapter focuses on the debt
restructuring process. Seeing the considerable number of countries subject to EDP or dangerously
close to the 60% GDP of debt and 3% GDP of deficit limits, several supranational, national and
subnational fiscal rules have been implemented in order to ensure fiscal discipline. There are many
different fiscal rules for containing the debt level of a country, varying from having different
characteristics and specific scope (subchapter 3.1.3). In particular the debt rule allows to establish a
governmental debt ceiling which ensures sustainability and easy monitoring. Its no-short term
influence can be avoided if the debt rule is combined with a deficit rule, in fact this formula is
widespread across European Union Members. In addition, there are budget balance rules like overall
balance, structural balance and balance over the cycle rules. These rules are also implemented to have
5a greater fiscal discipline, taking into account the concepts of economic cycles and cyclical
components in order to establish a budget limit that excludes the cyclical variations, thus being
efficient over the long-term. Expenditure rules establish governmental spending limits (excluding the
spending categories directly correlated with the public finance quality), forcing politicians to define
spending priorities to fulfil the threshold imposed. Also this rule should be accompanied by another
rule or by a revenue rule, otherwise it can not be totally effective. The revenue rule sets a revenue
maximum to prevent surcharging and sets a revenue minimum for securing the necessary funds to
fulfil financial commitments.
After having analysed different fiscal rules, in the second part of the Chapter (3.2) we will
econometrically analysed the impact of specific fiscal rules on the public debt of a EU Member
country. Using the “Fiscal Rule Index” methodology designed by the European Commission,
Marneffe et al. (2011) we will verify the positive impact of fiscal rules on fiscal balances and hence on
fiscal discipline. In this subchapter different studies are considered, such as Lara and Wolff (2011),
Hatchondo et al. (2012) etc.
The last part of this research (chapter 3.3) studies the case of Swiss debt brake being an example of a
successful fiscal restructuring process. This analysis highlights the mechanisms and the operating
principles that have made it possible to restore the swiss finances since 2005 (date of the effective
implementation of the rule). In fact after this period, the swiss debt steadily decreased, proving the
effectiveness  of debt rules in improving the country's fiscal discipline. 
2. The increasing debt trend in Europe
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first subchapter we will give an idea about the amplitude
and the evolution of the sovereign debt problem in Europe. In the second subchapter, we try to explain
the debt accumulation problem with the analysis of structural and primary deficit changes in Eurozone
countries. In the third part we focus on the economic and political reasons stimulating the debt
accumulation. In conclusion, the fourth subchapter defines the debt sustainability and the consequent
need for fiscal consolidation. 
2.1 European debt evolution
From 2010 the increase of sovereign debt has reached problematic levels in advanced economies
causing a sovereign debt crisis  all around the world. Beginning in Greece, the european sovereign
6debt crisis gradually affected the rest of Europe. In fact, the greek debt-to-GDP has risen from 108.9%
in 2000 to 147.8% in 2010, becoming the  first indebted country in Europe (OECD stat, 2012). This
debt increasing trend  has its affect worldwide, as we can observe from the 2012's OECD statistic
(Figure 1). Except for Norway and Switzerland (the only countries with a debt reduction in this period
and which will be discussed in Chapter 3), we verify a general and unprecedented debt accumulation
characterising most of the OECD countries. In particular, we notice the considerable increase in Irish
debt (from 28.7 % GDP in 2007 to even 91.7% GDP in 2010) due to the several rescue plans set for
bailout of irish banks (OECD stat, 2012). An important debt-to-GDP increase is also verified in Italy,
becoming the second most problematic country in Europe with a debt level of 126% GDP in 2010
(OECD stat, 2012).
Figure 1: Debt has jumped during the crisis in almost all countries - Gross government financial
liabilities 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 89 Database
In 2011 the European gross debt average for 17 eurozone countries was 88.0% GDP (Latvia is in the
eurozone since 2014 so is not considered in the data of 2011), while the estimation for 2013 was
92.7% GDP (European Commission, 2012). As we can see from the Figure 1, among the 17 eurozone
countries there are large differences of gross debt ratio. With regard to the European Union countries
average (EU-27 in 2011), the debt-to-GDP results a bit lower compared to 17 eurozone countries
(83.0% GDP in 2011 while the estimation for 2013 is 87.3% GDP). This can be explained by the fact
that the EU average incorporates countries with a low sovereign debt rates like Bulgaria, Latvia and
Sweden (European Commission, 2012).
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7Although the convergence criteria has been introduced to ensure fiscal sustainability within the
European Union, we can observe a considerable fiscal indiscipline across Member State.
Consequently, most of EU Member States are prone to “Excessive deficit procedure“, jeopardising the
credibility of the european debt rule and reducing its effective impact on country discipline. Additional
and unprecedented fiscal adjustments are hence required in order to reduce debt to an endurable level.  
2.2 Structural and primary deficit within European Union	  
After having treated the debt accumulation in the European union, we will analyse the deficit trend
explaining the origin of the sovereign debt problem. In the period from 2002 to 2008 many excessive
deficit procedures have been opened, as in the case of Portugal, France, Germany, Netherlands, Greece
and Italy while in June 2008 no-one was imputed for EDP. As we can observe from  Table 1, the
eurozone deficit increases particularly from 2000 (budget balance of -1.1% GDP) to 2004 (budget
balance of -3.0% GDP), as confirmed by  several excessive deficit procedure (OECD, 2010). The
second important deficit increase is in the period from 2007 (budget balance of -0.6% GDP) to 2010
(budget balance of -6.3% GDP) where the eurozone deficit and debt explode due to the consequences
of the financial crisis (OECD, 2010). 
Table 1: Public finance in eurozone
The structural primary budget (named SPS in the Table 1) is defined as the budget balance excluding
both the interest payments on government debt (i.e. primary budget) and the estimated cyclical
8component of government revenue and spending (i.e. structural budget) (European Commission web
glossary; for deepen definition cf. Chapter 3). Despite the negative budget balance, the structural
primary budget verifies a positive trend from 1998 (SPS of 2.0% GDP) to 2007 (SPS of 1.5% GDP) in
the eurozone due to the positive growth rate and to the diminution of public expenditures (austerity
plans in consequence to EDP) (OECD, 2010). This curious situation can be explained by both the
exclusion of cyclical components (predominantly negative) and interest payments (in decreasing trend
but essentially significant) from the primary structural balance. In fact, both these  factors influenced
negatively the eurozone's budget balance, explaining the negative budget balance and the increasing
debt level. Contrarily, in the period from 2007 to 2009 the structural primary budget decreases
considerably (SPS of -1.7% GDP in 2009). This negative trend is caused by the big economic
slowdown that negatively affects not only the budget balance but also its structural part (OECD,
2010). In consequence, the decrease of structural primary balance (-1.7% GDP in 2009) and the
negative budget balance (-6.1% GDP in 2009) accumulate public deficits and debt within the eurozone
(OECD, 2010). It is important to underline that deficits or negative structural primary balance are not
the result of past structural disequilibrium but from economic slowdown and the financial aid
earmarked to combat the financial crisis (Mathieu et al., 2011). Moreover, the decrease of tax revenues
and the increase of  unemployment during the crisis has helped  exacerbate the budget balance and the
structural primary balance.
In 2010 there was a slight improvement of structural primary budget (SPS from -1.7 to -1.4 % GDP)
thanks to the partial economic recovery and to the structural reforms implemented in Greece, Iceland,
Ireland and Portugal as a consequence of the their sovereign debt crisis (OECD, 2010). The deficit
level in 2010 (- 6.3% GDP) is the result of financial plans to overcome the crisis and decreasing tax
revenue consequent to the financial troubles. Considering the 2013's Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2013), in
2011 the average deficit in the eurozone  diminished (- 4.2% GDP in 2011) thanks to the recovery in
tax revenues (from 44.8% GDP in 2010 to 45.3% GDP in 2011) and a further reduction of public
expenditure (from 51.0% GDP in 2010 to 49.5% GDP in 2011) due to the austerity policies
implemented in many eurozone countries. This positive trend concerning the public deficit also
continues in 2012 (- 3.7% GDP in 2012) particularly due to the fiscal revenue increase (46.2% GDP
for 2012) and to the favourable economic growth (GDP increase from 9'424 billion  euro for 2011 to
9'490 billion  euro for 2012) (Eurostat, 2013). Moreover, a slight but positive increase in public
expenditure is registered for 2012 (49.9% GDP), indicating a partial recovery from the crisis (Eurostat,
2013).
9Regarding the European Union (not only the eurozone like before), 2012 was characterised by low
government deficits in countries like (Eurostat, 2013): Estonia (-0.3% GDP), Sweden (-0.5% GDP),
Bulgaria (-0.8% GDP), Luxembourg (-0.8% GDP) and Latvia (-1.2% GDP) and even a budget surplus
in the case of Germany (+0.2% GDP). Contrarily, the rest of member states surpassed the 3% GDP
deficit threshold defined by convergence criteria (Eurostat, 2013): Spain (-10.6% GDP), Greece (-
10.0% GDP), Ireland (-7.6% GDP), Portugal (-6.4% GDP), Cyprus (-6.3 % GDP), the United
Kingdom (-6.3% GDP), France (-4.8% GDP), the Czech Republic (-4.4% GDP), Slovakia (-4.3%
GDP), the Netherlands (-4.1% GDP), Denmark (-4.0% GDP), Slovenia (-4.0% GDP), Belgium (-3.9%
GDP), Poland (-3.9% GDP), Malta (-3.3% GDP), Lithuania (-3.2% GDP) and Italy (-3.0% GDP).
These countries with an excessive deficit have excessive or unsustainable public finances.
2.3 Main causes behind the debt accumulation
This subchapter focuses on political and economic causes of an increase in public debt, which go
beyond the specific factors triggering the recent sovereign debt crisis. 
As argued by Alesina and Perotti (1995), the debt accumulation problem can not be explained only
from an economic reasons but should be accompanied by political  considerations.
We begin with the definition of debt-to-GDP ratio so we can then analyse the influence of each
economic variable on the debt formation. The second part of this chapter will analyse the political
variables affecting the sovereign debt level. 
2.3.1 Debt-to-GDP definition and economic variables
According to the European Commission study, the debt-to-GDP ratio of a government at time t (bt) is
obtained by considering the debt evolution and assuming zero stock-flow adjustments (European
Commission, 2012): 
bt=bt−1
1+i t
1+gt
− pbal t (2.1)
Where pbalt represents the primary budget balance over GDP at time t; it is the average effective
nominal interest rate on government debt; gt is the nominal GDP growth rate and bt-1 is the debt-to-
GDP ratio in the previous period. This equation shows how the debt-to-GDP ratio (at time t) depends
on the difference between the debt-to-GDP ratio from the previous period (multiplied with the actual
ratio of effective interest rate on debt and the growth rate of the economy) and the primary budget
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balance. The mutation of these economic variables have different impacts on debt-to-GDP ratio,
particularly leading to four different scenarios that will be discussed now. Firstly, if the average
interest rates on government debt are larger than GDP growth rate (at time t) and the primary budget
balance is negative (the governmental expenditure are bigger than sovereign revenue), the debt-to-
GDP ratio is expected to increase continuously (compared to the previous period) raising the
insolvency risk in the medium and long term. Secondly, the GDP growth rate is higher than it and the
primary budget records a deficit. In this case, if the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is larger than steady state,
the debt-to-GDP ratio will decline and converge towards a steady state economy. The steady state
economy is defined as an inter-temporal equilibrium between debt ratio and primary budget position,
in which the governmental fiscal policy is considered sustainable (Collignon, 2012; for debt
sustainability cf. subchapter 2.3). 
In order to reduce debt-to-GDP ratio, the growth rates have to be sufficiently larger while the primary
deficit must be as small as possible. In the opposite case, where the debt-to-GDP ratio is lower
compared to the steady level, the ratio will increase in order to reach the steady state of economy.
Thirdly, if the interest rate on debt is higher than growth rate and the primary budget balance results
are positive (revenue larger than expenditures) then the tendency of debt-to-GDP is not certainly
known. In particular, when the country is not in a stationary situation, the debt-to-GDP ratio tends to
decrease if the changes in growth rate (respect to t-1) are sufficiently small and the increased revenues
are sufficiently large. In cases where the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is above a stationary level, the ratio
tends towards infinity, causing debt sustainability problems. Fourthly, the GDP growth rate increases
more sharply than interest rate on debt and a positive primary balance is registered. In this situation the
debt-to-GDP ratio will strongly decrease, considerably reducing the insolvency risk of government. 
In conclusion, these four situations summarise the possible influences of economic variables (such as
GDP growth rate, interest rate on government debt, primary budget balance and debt-to-GDP ratio of
previous periods) in determining the debt-to-GDP ratio of a government. As we have shown above, the
real impact of each economic variable depends on specific situation, or from changes of other
economic variables. In general, we can conclude that factors giving a boost to the increase of debt-to-
GDP ratios  are raising interest rate on government debts, decreasing GDP growth rates, greater debt-
to-GDP ratios in previous periods and additional primary deficits over GDP (Blanchard et al., 2007).  
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2.3.2 Political causes
After having analysed the main economic variables, we will see now the political factors have a direct
impact on the debt-to-GDP level. We first analyse the relation between the government's
fragmentation and the existence of deficits and debt. In particular, the multiparty governments have
the tendency to engage higher levels of spending in comparison to a single-party government,
consequently causing higher deficits. At the base of spending decisions is a problem of common pool
resources that create difficulties in containing governmental expenditure, therefore expanding  the size
of the public sector  (Persson et al., 2007). This common pool resource problem (cf. Box 1) further
increases when the governmental coalition size is enlarged (additional parties participate to the
coalition). The study conducted by Persson (2007) on UK colonies (with an estimation of ordinary
least squares OLS for 1990s) proves a correlation between multiparty coalition government and
excessive level of spending. In detail, the multiparty coalition government works in the following way:
each party tries (through their elected ministers) to “push“ spending in the favoured area of their
constituents in order to take  advantage of these public expenses. Electoral motivation is the main
policy-makers advantage, this opportunistic behaviour creates higher deficits in election years so as to
gain popularity for its reelection or for maintain the stable governmental coalition, consequently
increasing public debt. This is indeed  demonstrated by Mink (2006) who provide that this
opportunistic behaviour creates higher deficits in EU member states (after the introduction of EMU)
during election periods. Therefore, policy-makers are representing specific interest groups or
orientation parties, so they tend to overestimate the spending's net benefit for the whole society in
order to legitimate their decisions. Concerning the spending decisions of other parties, they have weak
stimulus to block them as they allow the reduction of responsibility of their specific expenditures.
Both these mechanisms create an obvious incentive to increase public expenditure and therefore raise
the probability of recording deficits in the state budget (Persson et al., 2007). Persson (2007)
concludes that UK multiparty coalition governments are less efficient because they encourage
excessive expenditure that entail deficits and debt accumulation. This inefficiency increases with the
growth of parties' numbers in the government coalition. Moreover, the empirical study conducted by
Vanberg et al. (2012) on fifteen European Countries for the period 1970-2009, also proves that
multiparty coalition governments have a higher probability of accumulating more deficit and debt.
Additionally, it demonstrates that deficit and debt further increase when political tenures are shorter.
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Box 1: Common pool problem
The “common pool“ problem of public budgeting arises from a divergence between  marginal social
utility and marginal social costs. The beneficiaries of a particular good or service do not fully coincide
with the taxpayers (who are more numerous), therefore the governmental public policy causes a
redistribution effect within the population. The beneficiaries are choosen from policy-markers who
take the spending decision in order to favour their electorate or interest area. The costs of these public
policies are diffused to the whole population, while the beneficiaries are targeted in some specific
groups decided by policymakers (Von Hagen and Harden, 1996). We can therefore say that these
public policies create externalities, as they use money from general taxes to finance projects aimed at
specific targeted groups (Von Hagen, 2002, pp. 263-284). This mechanism involves a greater
tendency to ask public services compared to the case where the target groups bear all the costs. This
method incentivises excessive spending levels, excessive deficits and government debt, as costs are
not completely internalized by beneficiaries (Velasco, 1999; Von Hagen and Harden, 1996). In the
case of multiparty government, this common pool problem is more remarkable than in a single-party
government. In fact, when the ruling parties are numerous, the overspending is greater as every
policymaker tries to spend addressing to its specific electorate or by following their own interests.
The second important aspect of political variables is represented by the effect of political instability on
budget deficits, in other words the impact of government duration on public budget. Several
economists (Cukierman et al., 1992; Tabellini et al., 1990; Persson et al., 1990) find a correlation
between political instability and higher debt levels. When a country is characterised by large political
instability, the government has the tendency to act with short-term policy strategies (different for each
party or interest group) because of the incertitude about its reelection and about future coalition's
composition (different party composition within a coalition can considerably change its finance
policy). This attitude of being determined by short-term considerations instead of long-term strategies,
engenders a debt bias: government have the tendency to increase spending, not raising tax rates (or
even reducing it), causing a debt growth and consequently a rise of debt servicing costs (Persson et al.,
1989; Das et al., 2010). 
Economists like Persson, Tabellini and Alesina (1990) highlight the strategic role of debt to convince
the electorate to renew their confidence in such governments, thus causing a significant increase in
debt levels when political instability is greater.
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The soft budget constraint (SBC) is another political aspect explaining the debt accumulation in
transition and developing countries. This problem arises from the decentralization processes or
responsibilities transferred from central government to lower levels of government but maintaining a
central government's strong interest on local finance (also if its control over sub-national government
finance is limited because of substantial local autonomy). The local government interprets this
decentralization process as an expectation to be bailed out or receive additional funds from the central
government in case of financial trouble. This financial rescue expectation from the upper-layer of
government creates a consequent softened local budget constraint (Vigneault, 2010). In fact, local
jurisdictions are independent in deciding their fiscal policy like tax rates, public expenditures and
public borrowing in order to become more attractive for individuals and enterprises. This decision is
often influenced by the expectation of receiving additional funds from the central government, in fact
sub-national governments can behave in an opportunistic manner decreasing tax rates and hence their
tax revenue (in order to attract more taxpayers) such that it will be compensated by upper financial
aids. Rodden (2008) articulates that the scale of the SBC problem depends on different countries and
particularly on the vertical tax gap or “the extent to which subnational governments’ expenditures
exceed their own-source tax revenues“ (Rodden et al., 2008; p. 1). When this tax gap is large or when
local government decides to cut important expenditure categories (for example education), the upper-
layer financial aid or the central bailing out is necessary for re-equilibrate the sub-national finances.
Moreover Wildasin (1997) verifies that upper-layer governments have interest in bailing out
subnational entities when the latter have greater negative externalities to other jurisdictions or when it
is “too big to fail”. The bailout mechanisms cause a common pool problem, such that the cost of
federal bailout is redistributed to the whole sub-national jurisdictions within a country (Wildasin,
1997). The expectation of being bailed out by federal government creates an incentive for subnational
jurisdiction to make excessive spending and consequently accumulate deficits and debt (Pisauro,
2001). Indeed, Kornai (2003) concludes that SBC problems create a debt level increase, such that sub-
national jurisdictions take higher risks (such as reducing the tax rate or increasing expenses) expecting
to be financially rescue from the federal government in case of financial crisis.  
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2.4 Debt sustainability 
In this subchapter we will focus on debt sustainability, based on the IMF definition and on its “debt
sustainability analyses (DSAs)“.
According to the IMF definition, a debt is considered "sustainable if it satisfies the solvency condition
without a major correction [...] given the costs of financing" (IMF, 2002, p.5). The solvency condition
or the inter-temporal budget constraint (cf. Box 2) is fulfilled when “future primary surpluses will be
large enough to pay back the debt, principal and interest“ (IMF, 2002, p.5). In other words, the current
debt plus the discounted value of the costs must not exceed the present value of revenue. So if the
governmental revenues are not large enough to bear with the costs associated with public debt, there
will be a problem of debt sustainability expressed by an excessive debt-to-GDP ratio. A higher debt-
to-GDP ratio requires a higher primary surplus for sustaining it, in addition this debt accumulation is
associated with higher interest rates and possible decline in growth rate, involving an even larger
primary surplus needed to stabilise the debt ratio (IMF, 2011). In particular, Collignon (2012)
distinguishes between strong and weak debt sustainability. Considering the previous steady state
economy concept (subchapter 2.2.1), he defines the strong debt sustainability as the situation in which
the public debt levels converge to the steady state economy (Collignon et al., 2012). In this case the
inter-temporal budget constraint is fulfilled because the initial debt level is compensated by future
primary budget surpluses (discounted with the interest rate on public debt and taking into account the
GDP growth rate) and consequently the governmental debt level is considered strongly sustainable
(Collignon et al., 2012). When the public debt doesn't coincide totally with the steady state economy,
the debt sustainability of a specific country is considered weak. The government is therefore unable to
continue with a weak fiscal debt sustainability or even an unsustainable fiscal policy, requiring a fiscal
restructuring policy. We will see how fiscal rules allow to restructure the governmental policy in order
to respect debt sustainability in the Chapter 3.
Box 2: Solvency conditions and inter-temporal budget constraint (Ley, 2010)
Algebraically, the governmental solvency condition is fulfilled when:
D ( p , r ,π)=B(b , r.π ) (2.2)
where D represent the stock of government debt, B the primary government balance, both expressed
in term of r (average interest rate), π (inflation rate) and p (net present value of future payments).
Assuming that primary balances progress in line with nominal GDP growth (g for GDP growth rate),
or constant balance as a percent-to-GDP, we have the following inter-temporal budget constraint:
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        Bt=(1+g )(1+π )B    (2.3)
Following the whole mathematical transformation of the World Bank study (Ley, 2010), we lead to
the required balance budget (b*) for preserving a stable debt-to-GDP ratio. The required balance is
calculated as follow:
b∗= r−g
1+g
.d s (2.4)
where ds is the current debt ratio. The objective is not to have a zero debt ratio, but to simply stabilise
it in order to be sustainable. The growth rate is therefore important for determine b*. When g
increases, then the required balance budget (for respecting the solvency criteria) is lower. For a rising
average interest rate, the required balance budget for fulfilling solvency criteria is larger and more
difficult to reach. This mathematical representation is useful for understanding how each components
influence solvency criteria, and more generally when a debt can be considered sustainable. 
The main problem in determining fiscal sustainability is the uncertainty and imprecision in the
parameters calculation. In fact real interest rate on debt and long-term real growth of GDP are
uncertain and must be correctly estimated in order to establish a correct fiscal sustainability of a
country. This estimation method will not treated in detail throughout this thesis. 
Since 2002 the IMF has implemented the “debt sustainability analyses (DSAs)“, a surveillance
programs aiming to analyse the country's capacity to finance its policy objectives and its debt services
(without resorting to severe expenditures cuts or large revenue increases). This analysis allows to
highlight and prevent potential payments crisis, assessing the current debt situation (both total public
debt and total external debt) and identifying possible debt vulnerability (IMF, 2013). The DSA
assessment takes into account the economic and financial environment of given country, categorising
it into two framework types: advanced economies or low-income countries. In the figure below we
consider only the advanced economies (AE) and we verify that 19 AE countries' debt exceed the 60
percent ceiling (considered as long-run debt range by Ostry et al., 2010). Although at the end of 2010
these countries (like Greece or Italy) are above the long-run debt threshold, they comply with the
IMF's debt sustainability criteria of DSA study, as we can gather from Figure 2. Japan represent an
exception due to the problematic debt level of the country in 2010, which is a consequence of the
Fukushima disaster and the related reconstruction efforts.
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Figure 2: Long-run Debt and Maximum Sustainable Debt: Advanced Economies (percent of 
GDP, end-2010)
Source: WEO and Ostry et al., 2010
3. Debt restructuring process: implementation of fiscal rules  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the problem of sovereign debt arises from the 90s and reached its
peak on 2009-2010 with the governmental debt crisis. This sovereign debt and public finances crisis
have further stimulated the introduction of new local fiscal rules. In fact, numerous bailouts made
possible by substantial IMF and EU loans have been accompanied by strict fiscal adjustments and
spending reductions in domestic economy.
The first subchapter (3.1) will explain the fiscal rule definition and its main objectives. Then different
types of existing fiscal rules are analysed, namely debt and deficit rules, budget balance and structural
budget balance rules, expenditure rules and the combination of different rules. The second subchapter
(3.2) will analyse the econometric impact of a rule introduction on the governmental fiscal
performance of European countries using the “Fiscal Rule Index” methodology designed by European
Commission. In the last subchapter (3.3) we examine the debt brake implementation in Switzerland,
explaining this study case choice, its mechanisms and its effectiveness in reducing the swiss debt since
2003.  
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3.1 Survey on the different fiscal rules methods  
According to an IMF study (2009), fiscal rules are implemented in 80 countries and may vary from
constraints on total government expenditures, deficits or debt. In this chapter we will analyse the
objectives and characteristics of fiscal rules, reviewing some fiscal rule types that can be chosen by
politicians. We will highlight the different structures for each rule and their effectiveness in debt
reduction. 
3.1.1 Definition and characteristics of fiscal rules
Before starting to look into various forms of fiscal rules and their impact on fiscal policies, it is
necessary to better understand their definition and characteristics. 
Many definitions about this topic are possible, in particular we refer to Kennedy et al. (2001, p. 238)
that defined a fiscal rule as a “statutory or constitutional restriction on fiscal policy setting a specific
limit on a fiscal indicator such as the budgetary balance, debt, spending, or taxation“. In other words,
fiscal rules are binding constraints able to influence present and future governmental decisions,
changing the fiscal policy framework of subnational, national or supranational authorities. These
constraints are established differently depending on the type of fiscal rule, inasmuch are expressed in
reference to budget deficit, revenues, expenditures or debt ceiling (cf. Chapter 3.1.3). The above-
mentioned definition of Kennedy (2001) is aligned with others authors’ studies, which considered
fiscal rules as  restrictions on fiscal policy process over time (Kopits et al. (1998); Buti et al. (2002);
Milesi-Ferretti (2000)). 
After the fiscal rule definition, it will be noteworthy to analyse the main characteristics of these rules
according to Kopits and Symanski (1998). In particular, we will examine the following five aspects:
legal basis, rule's coverage, enforcement procedures and finally the flexibility of the rule. 
Firstly, legal basis plays an important role because it assures the legitimacy of national rules, resulting
from different features: constitutional law, statutory law, coalition agreements or political
commitments. Constitutional law is characterised by a complicated and long-lasting procedure for
changing or revoking a constitutional provision. For this reason, constitutional laws are generally less
effective in constraining the rule over long period (Kennedy, 2001). Contrarily, the statutory fiscal rule
is more subject to fluctuations over the years, due to easily changing procedures and because of its
greater clarity (with economic parameters specification) that requires modifications when economic
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situation changes (Kennedy, 2001). Moreover, coalition agreements are established within a national
government, particularly between different political parties or interest groups from different
government levels. These agreements change over long term because they result from political
negotiations influenced from national or international political and economic contexts. In other words,
the changing political composition of a country can radically modify the coalition agreement,
transforming  its fiscal policy orientation (Schick, 2003). For this reason, the political commitments set
in a coalition agreement are usually limited to a single fiscal year, which means constant fiscal policy
changes (new commitments at the end of  every year) and no stable fiscal discipline over the long-
term. Fiscal commitments are defined as the governmental willingness to comply with a rule, this
means that, when conditions change (economy or politics changes), the enforcement of this rule is not
assured (OECD, 2003). There is a strong link between the legal basis' composition and the specific
politics and economic circumstances of a country. Legal support is different in each country, in fact,
emerging or developing countries are predominantly characterised by statutory norms. In these cases,
statutory law represents the easier way for achieving a compulsory support for the respect of the rule.
Regarding developed countries, the political commitments or coalition agreements represent the main
instrument for enacting legal basis (IMF, 2012). Being the result of various domestic policy
negotiations, these commitments and agreements have generally greater social/political acceptance
because of their adaptability and are indicated for central or general government constraints (IMF,
2009). At local or regional government level, the fiscal rules are mostly statutory or constitutional laws
(IMF, 2009). As shown by the IMF study, at the regional and local level the enforcement mechanisms
are then stronger in comparison to the general and central government. In conclusion, constitution and
statutory laws have a direct impact on fiscal discipline setting binding constraint on fiscal policy,
while political commitment and coalition agreements have an indirect influence establishing fiscal
policy measures and benchmarks values. 
Countries with fiscal rules set by statutory laws are Austria (budget balance rule since 1999) and France (revenue
rule in 2011), coalition agreements characterised Belgium (expenditure rule since 1993 and revenue rule since
1992) and Finland (debt rule in 1995 and revisited in 2011), political commitment distinguish Norway (budget
balance rule since 2001), while constitutional laws were adopted by Germany (budget balance rule in 1969 and
revisited in 2011) and Switzerland (debt brake rule in 2003) (IMF, 2013). 
Secondly, the fiscal rule coverage establishes  which governmental level and sector it is applied to. In
particular, the coverage rule is distinguished between three cases: central government, general
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government (including central and subnational governments) or wider public sector coverage
(including security accounts or public companies). Moreover, the rule coverage should specify what
expenditure and revenue items are included in the target variable. 
The fiscal policy management of a country is carried out at multiple governmental levels. In fact, the
coverage of fiscal rules may vary from the national to the supranational level. The bulk of
supranational rules are addressed to general government aggregates, while national rules guarantee a
coverage for central government but without envisaged constraints for subnational entities. 
Referring to the national rules, the central government coverage is mainly guaranteed by national expenditure
rules and national budget balance rules, accentuating autonomy and coordination issues with sub-nationals
entities. At the supranational level, the general government coverage is mainly set by debt and balance rules (IMF,
2012).
A national rule thus requires additional subnational rules set independently for each local government.
In countries with a decentralised framework, it becomes essential to find proper coordination on
different governmental levels in order to ensure macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline. It is
therefore important to implement a sound fiscal policy shared across multiple tiers of government;
circumventing the subnational possibility to overspend, under-tax and borrow excessively. Fiscal
policy decentralization across different governmental levels create three main issues. First, the
“common pool“ problem is manifested when “multiple territorially overlapping governments share the
authority to provide services and levy taxes in a common geographic area“ (Berry, 2008, p. 802). The
Berry's study highlights how (across U.S. government levels) the financial integration across
overlapping government tends to create inefficiencies, inasmuch the divergence between marginal
social utility and marginal social costs causes higher debt level than it would be if all costs would be
assumed from the targeted beneficiaries. Second, the moral hazard arises from the local incentive to
weaken their fiscal responsibility transferring the economic cost of indiscipline to the central
government (Ter-Minassian, 2007). In fact, local indiscipline cause strong political and social
consequences that forces the central government to bailout the subnational government. These
mechanisms cause a softening of local budget constraints, due to the scarce credibility of any no-
bailout attempt by central government. Indeed, Goodspeed (2002) shows how lower levels of
government can lead the central government to implement bailout policies. Furthermore, he highlights
how this mechanisms is more common in the case of a discretionary power of central government,
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making it possible to modify its grant allocation in favour of subnational level. This topic is studied by
a wide number of economists like Tommasi (1999), Von Hagen and Dahlberg (2002), Borge and
Rattso (1999) and it was elaborated in the Chapter 2. Third, the presence of constitutionals autonomy
for subnational jurisdictions limits the constraining power of central government. In fact, the central
government is not able to set and enforce effective budget constraint on the local level, because of the
local fiscal autonomy. This subnational autonomy creates a fiscal competition among local
jurisdictions that may create difficulties in implementing coordinated stabilisation policies on different
governmental levels within a country. In conclusion, the fiscal decentralisation can be characterised by
macroeconomic instability, higher deficits and debt levels (Goodspeed, 2002).
As we have previously disclosed, the fiscal rules should specify what expenditure and revenue items
are covered by the targeted rule. According to a recent IMF's study (Schaechter et al., 2012), about 20
percent of OECD countries exclude certain types of expenditures and revenues (like interest payments,
cyclically-sensitive expenditure and capital expenditures) from the application of a specific fiscal rule.
The omission of capital expenditure is widespread globally, even if the interest payment and the
cyclical expenditures exclusion are predominantly in European countries (Schaechter et al., 2012). The
interest payments are often excluded from the target variables, as they result from choices of
expenditure made by previous governments and therefore should not affect present policy. The
cyclically sensitive expenditures contain volatile items, so they are excluded in order to limit overall
stability problems due to the difficult variation forecast. The omission of cyclically sensitive
expenditure decreases the influence of countercyclical policy and also requires spending adjustments
during the short term. We have to consider that often a greater vulnerability affects governmental
revenues and lesser spending (Schaechter et al., 2012).
For example, interest payments are excluded from the target variable in France, Finland, Spain and Sweden.
Denmark, Finland and Switzerland exclude ciclically-sensitive expenditures, while Brazil and Japan exclude
capital expenditures.
Thirdly, the enforcement mechanism is a fundamental characteristic that is definite if there are formal
enforcement procedures and/or monitoring mechanisms of compliance outside the government.
Concerning formal enforcement procedures, each country decides to establish a corrective mechanism
at the national level in order to envisage sanctions for non compliance of such rules. This characteristic
directly influences the success of a fiscal rule as the cost of non respect/abandoning of such rules
would be higher than the benefit of breaking it. In case of deviations from fiscal targets, a sanction will
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be addressed to the government, making the rule more effective and stringent (Debrun et al., 2008).
Sanctions differ depending on the type of fiscal rule and from the supranational institutions. 
Box 3: Excessive deficit procedure in European Union
In the European Union, countries violating the Convergence Criteria (general government deficit of
3% GDP and gross debt of 60% GDP) are subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). If the
ECOFIN Council considers the exceeded deficit as an exceptional and temporary deviation from the
reference value, no procedure is addressed. Contrarily, if the qualified majority of the Council judge
the deviated deficit not exceptional, even if temporary, an excessive deficit procedure is officially
opened for a Member State. The determination of EDP considers relevant factors such as development
in the medium-term economic position, cyclical conditions, implementation of research and
innovation policies, structural reforms and fiscal consolidation efforts in normal situations (EC
Council Regulation, No 1177/2011). In some special cases, the Council considers these factors in
order to avoid a deficit procedure, allowing a bigger transition time to comply with the rule. When
EDP is confirmed by the Council, the latter make recommendations to Member State defining the size
of fiscal adjustment needed and the deadline for these corrections. Which is that the Member State
should register a yearly structural deficit improvement at minimum of 0.5% of GDP each year. 
Revised recommendations can be admitted in case of unexpected adverse economic events
(subsequent to the EDP execution) causing additional unfavourable consequences in the public
finance of the concerned member state. After this recommendation period, Member States subject to
EDP have to face sanctions provided for in Article 129 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
Moreover, with the new “Six-Pack“ measures of the Stability and Growth Pact, approved by the
European Commission and the European Parliament, the european economic governance results
promptly reinforced. Given the grand number of countries subject to an EDP (currently 23 of the 27
member states), the recommendations and deadlines set by the EU Council require additional
measures contained in the new “Six-Pack“ legislation (referred to euro area and into force since
december 2011). The enforcement mechanisms generated from this new legislation package are based
on financial sanctions that arise in case of deficit deviations. In particular, an interest-bearing deposit
of 0.2% of GDP is imposed, and every additional year the Council can intensify the sanction requiring
one tenth of the difference between the deficit (as % GDP) in the preceding year and the reference
value of 3 % of GDP (E U Regulation, No 1173/2011). Moreover, the “reverse qualified majority“
voting system strengthened the enforcement mechanism, semi-automatically adopting a Commission
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recommendation since no qualified majority of Member States is needed. This new legislative
package guarantees the enforcement procedure of Convergence Criteria, allowing a greater fiscal
discipline and a stable EU economy. 
Returning to the second characteristic of an enforcement procedure, we will consider the importance
of monitoring mechanisms of compliance outside the government. Monitoring systems envisage
independent overseers in order to point out existing or potential violations of fiscal rules. This
mechanisms is fundamental because it discovers and forecasts deviations from fiscal discipline,
enforcing the fiscal rule in place at the national or international level. For greater explanations we take
into account the monitoring principles in place in the European Union. 
Box 4: Monitoring mechanism within European Union
According to the Stability and Growth Pact, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission
are in charge of supervising the fiscal policy of each Member State. Particularly, the Commission
gives country-specific recommendations in case of significant divergence from the established target,
while the Council assess and delivers opinions about these guidances. Therefore both the Council of
Ministers and  the European Commission monitor the effective execution of the corrective
programmes and decide eventual additional actions in order to fulfil the budgetary objectives
(Balassone and Franco, 2001). Concerning the surveillance and monitoring within the European
Union, in May 2013 an additional reform called “Two Pack Regulation“ was introduced. This new
reform aims to reinforce the SGP's surveillance framework, requiring  Member States the
implementation of independent monitoring organisms in order to improve budgetary forecasts.
Moreover a graduated monitoring is established so as to detect early and then durably correct
excessive deficits of Member State. Therefore the Two Pack strengthened the enforcement of national
fiscal rules, improving the macroeconomic and budgetary forecast (EC, 2012). 
In conclusion, the enforcement mechanisms results in one of the main fundamental characteristics of
the effective implementation of a fiscal rule. 
Fourthly, flexibility of fiscal rules is considered. In particular, the possibility to have clearly-defined
escape clauses or cyclically adjusted fiscal balance. At first, we will analyse potential escape clauses.
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These give the possibility to flexibly react with temporal deviations from fiscal rules, in case of
extraordinary events (beyond the control of the authorities) such as unexpected economic recession,
natural disaster or bank insolvency. Each country defines in its law what specific circumstances are
subject to loopholes, providing distinct guidelines on the treatment of accumulated deviations (Kumar
et al., 2009). Escape clauses have been inserted in legislation to avoid calling fiscal rules into question,
when unexpected shocks appear, so as to maintain a rule credibility. The escape clauses are
characterised by possible interpretations and political measures in developing Countries. 
Referring to the EU Member States, in case of unforeseen shocks, no EDP is opened if the 3% deficit ceiling is
temporarily and exceptionally oversteped, moreover it has not to significantly overpass of the limit. This was set
by the 2005’s reform of the SGP contemplating escape clauses only in case of economic recession; in this
situation  the possibility of extending the time period of adjusting fiscal policy exists (Schaechter et al., 2012).
On the other hand, in Switzerland  natural disasters and other events outside government control are also
considered as escape clauses (Schaechter et al., 2012). The Swiss debt brake allows spending deviations from the
target in case of sharp recessions or unforeseeable events, inasmuch the political cost of respecting the rule
under these situations is definitely larger, encouraging this break (Geier, 2011). 
The escape clause hence represents  a solution for avoiding fiscal rule jeopardisation. The fiscal rule
flexibility envisages fiscal balance defined in cyclically adjusted terms. 
Box 5: Cyclical adjusted balance
Fiscal rules are flexible when budget balances are adjusted for cyclical effects (or temporary
measures) affecting the country-specific medium-term fiscal objectives. Cyclical adjusted balance
(CAB) is defined as a nominal budget balance  to GDP ratio (B/Y) subtracted from cyclical
components (CC). The algebraic equation is:
CAB= B
Y
−CC (3.1)
Cyclical components take into account two elements. First, the cyclical position of the economy (the
output gap OG) and, second, the link between the economic cycle and the budget (cyclical-adjustment
budgetary parameter ε). The cyclical components are defined as a time series (regular or periodic)
fluctuating around the trend (with expansion and contraction phases), without taking into account
irregular components (OECD, Glossary of statistical terms). The product of these two elements
provide the cyclical components size of the budget, in fact:
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CC=ε .OG (3.2)
This calculation method is characterised by uncertainty, as the potential output measurement and the
estimation vary with uncertainty. However, possible errors in this calculation are difficult to precisely
measure. The cyclical components of budget balance calculated through this formula show how they
corresponds to the cyclical elements of tax revenue and current primary expenditure. These elements
are sensitive to the output gaps estimation, the weighting tax revenue per category, the current
primary expenditure and the expenditure elasticities. 
3.1.2 Objectives of fiscal rules
As we shall see, fiscal rules have several objectives. 
First, fiscal rules aim to control/limit the size of the annual deficit in the current budget and to restrain
the government debt ratio. Indeed, deficit and debt sustainability are at the core of fiscal policy
objectives, in fact fiscal rules can help in containing the explosion of deficit and debt levels, making
politicians more alert and aware of the real financial capacity of the state improving the fiscal
responsibility. 
Second, a rule must provide a clear and transparent view about costs and benefits of public policies,
laying the groundwork to pursue efficient policies. More particularly, fiscal rules aim to reduce the
excessive level of spending, taxation and public borrowing in favour of economic stability. Fiscal rules
aim to contain the size of the government and supporting intergenerational equity. Future generations
are influenced by actual debt levels, in fact a higher debt level entails higher interest payments which
impose  on future taxpayers. An increasing debt can create several negative implications for future
generations, like higher taxes and inflation, lower government benefit, and higher economic
instability.
Third, the fiscal policy system of a government is positively influenced by fiscal rules. In fact the latter
are preserved in the medium or long term and aim to build a stable fiscal policy credibility. Through
fiscal rules, the fiscal credibility of a Central Bank's results are reinforced because of its sustainable
and stable policy (Fitoussi et Saraceno, 2007). 
For example, in the European Union the debt limit set by Maastricht criteria supports the European Central Bank
policy in maintaining a price stability (low inflation) and a sustainable fiscal debt in order to provide higher
credibility. In fact, supranational fiscal rules lead Member State to implement restrictive fiscal policies in order to
maintain a sustainable debt, limiting the monetary intervention of Central Bank, in particular concerning the
bailout of Member State. Despite the fact that  bail-outs from EU member states is formally prohibited (No-bail-
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out clause from Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU), the credibility of this clause has been
greatly challenged after the Greek crisis.
The no-bail-out clause represents a crucial and controversial point for fiscal discipline. In fact, due to
the several spillover effects deriving from excessive debt/deficit to the whole economic system, the
central government decide to support financially the lower-level of government, disregarding the
clause (Feld et al., 2013). Therefore this mechanism of no-bail-out has to be combined with an
adequate national fiscal rule framework in order to maintain a given discipline. 
In conclusion, fiscal rules aim to reinforce the credibility of the whole economic system, as it reduces
bailout opportunity and the Central Bank's monetary manoeuvres, maintaining a stable and credible
fiscal policy within the Country or in the EU.
3.1.3 Types of fiscal rules
In this subsection we will deal with certain types of fiscal rules as debt and deficit rules, budget
balance rules, structural budget balance rules, expenditure rules and some possible combination
between these rules. We will show how each type of fiscal rule is characterised from different
properties associated to diverse objectives. 
3.1.3.1 Debt and deficit rules
In this subchapter we will first discuss  the debt rule and then the deficit rules. Concerning the debt
rule, Schaechter et al. (2012) defined it as an "explicit limit or target for public debt in percent of
GDP"(for more detail cf. equation 2.1). The debt-to-GDP ratio relates the sovereign debt with the
economic output of a country (annual GDP). As discussed in the second chapter, the importance of a
correct estimation of GDP evolution and a proper calculation of public debt level are central in
determining the debt-to-GDP ratio of a country. It is crucial for observing possibles deviation from the
debt target and establishing structural reforms. In particular, this ratio reveals the country's ability to
pay off its debt, influencing the country borrowing costs and the governmental bond yields. In general,
a higher debt-to-GDP ratio entails higher costs for paying back loans and for obtaining new credits,
because of the higher interest rate required by investors. 
Concerning the European Union, the maximum debt level accepted is 60% of GDP and eventual gaps between the
debt level and the reference debt limit have to be reduced annually to 1/20th on average over three-years (Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU, Art. 126). 
After a brief definition, we analyse the positive and negative aspects related to the debt rules.The
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positive aspects of debt rules are mainly two. Firstly, this rule ensures convergence to debt limit,
establishing a direct link to debt sustainability. In fact, a debt-to-GDP ceiling is calculated taking into
account all the variables ensuring the sustainability of the debt, such as the interest rate on debt, the
changes in GDP growth rate, the annual primary budget balance and last but not least the debt
accumulated during previous periods. In fact, the determination of debt-to-GDP ceiling through these
parameters guarantees the sustainability of sovereign debt. Secondly, this rule becomes almost easy to
communicate and monitor. Thanks to the standard calculation of debt-to-GDP limit, the identification
of possible deviations from the target is easily identifiable in each country. 
The negative aspects of debt rules  principally arise from the design and the time-horizon considered
by the rules. Firstly, a clear problem arises from no-short term influence of this indicator; in fact
budgetary measure take time to have a real impact on debt-to-GDP level so that there is no immediate
effect. Secondly, debt is sometimes influenced by external factors, such as exchange or interest rates
which are beyond the full control of government, making it difficult to achieve a complete discipline
(Schaechter et al., 2012). Thirdly, there is no economic stabilisation mechanism due to the pro-
cyclicality of this fiscal rule; in fact it becomes more binding when the economy is in a recession,
while less constraining in an expansion period. Generally in times of economic booms, spendings have
the tendency to grow (proportionately more than the current GDP growth) because of lower cost of
borrowing capital, while in recession time spending decrease (as a percentage of GDP) in order to
contain the debt level (Alesina et al., 2005). When the economy is in  a boom period, spendings have
the tendency to increase  causing a decrease in the primary budget balance (pbalt expressed as the
difference between public revenues and expenditures, cf. Equation 2.1). This primary budget balance
reduction is more pronounced than the increasing growth of GDP, creating an increase of debt-to-GDP
ratio (Equation 2.1 explain this mechanism). Therefore, in case of economic booms, the debt-to-GDP
rule is becoming “less binding“, because despite the fiscal rule, the debt level increases in the
subsequent period. During recessions, the expenditures have the tendency to decrease (because of
higher borrowing capital costs) stimulating the growth of primary budget balance (supposing
unchanged revenues). This primary budget balance increase results are proportionally higher than the
decrease of GDP growth (due to the recession), therefore there is a positive impact on debt-to-GDP
ratio (debt-to-GDP ratio decrease). Indeed, the positive impact of higher primary budget balance
prevails on the negative impact of economic slowdown. In conclusion, in case of economic recession,
the debt rule becomes “more binding“ because it allows to significantly reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio.
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At this point we explain in detail the deficit fiscal rule. The fiscal deficit to GDP ratio measures the
annual gap between budget revenues and predicted expenditures, in relation to the annual GDP of a
country. When such gap exists, governments have to finance it by borrowing; additional borrowings
causes an accumulation of national debt and a subsequent increase of interest on debt. In other words,
the deficit to GDP ratio shows the proportion between what the country borrows and the national
product, indicating the annual government's ability to repay debts. The introduction of a deficit limit
does not  solve the problem of pro-cyclicality that prevents economic stabilization. As we have
previously seen in the case of a debt rule, the pro-cyclicality also exists in the case of deficit making
the constraint less binding during economic growth and more binding in situations of economic
slowdown (Manasse, 2006). Given the direct link between annual deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio, a
combination of debt rule with a deficit threshold guarantees  debt sustainability (when this rules are
correctly respected by governments). 
In the European Union, the debt rule (previously explained) is combined with a deficit rule in order to attenuate
problem of no short-term influence. The Maastricht criteria set for member countries (see Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Art.126) provides a maximal deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3% GDP at the end
of each financial year. Otherwise, this ratio must be reduced in order to reach a level close to 3%, as any
deviation from the reference value is only exceptional and temporarily accepted. Remarkably also in the case of
deficit rule, the 3% GDP limit is exceeded in seventeen EU Member States causing economic repercussions on
national and supranational level (Eurostat website, 2011 data). 
3.1.3.2 Budget balance and structural budget balance rules
The rules on balanced budgets establish a direct link with debt sustainability, being directly affected
b y and under the control of politicians. These rules are mainly divided into four types: the overall
balance, the structural or cyclically adjusted balance and the balance over the cycle. 
Firstly, the overall balance rule aims to require federal spending equal (or lower) to governmental
revenue, in order to constitutionally prevent budget deficit. In particular, the overall balance is
composed of a cyclical and structural budget balance. This overall regulation presents advantages and
disadvantages  for each specific fiscal rule. In particular, the first flaw is caused by external factors
(beyond the full governmental control) that affect the budget balance of a country. For example, the
payment of interest on debt can modify the annual budget balance, inasmuch they can yearly change,
engendering a decreased governmental control . Another negative aspect of this rule is expressed by
the absence of an economic stabilisation feature; no compensation account for responding to economic
shocks is required by the rule, so fiscal policies have the tendency to become pro-cyclical. The overall
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balanced budget can cause a reduction in governmental finance quality and an inefficient allocation of
public resources, in cases where significative budget cuts are needed to comply with the rule. Often
these expenditure cuts are applied to the less politically-sensitive categories despite being important
expenses for R&D, education etc. (Schaechter et al., 2012). When the overall balance rule is correctly
fulfilled (without presence of annual deficit), the debt sustainability is guaranteed (Schaechter et al.,
2012). Moreover, the control and the communication of the overall budget balance results easy to
realise in most countries.  
Subsequently, the cyclically adjusted balance consists of a structural budget balance rule introduced
with the 2005 reform of the SGP. This rule is more laboriously communicated and supervised, as it is
based on adjustment estimates that are adapted only at the end of a cycle, as in the case of “over a
cycle“ rule. Moreover, “the structural budget balance is the government’s actual fiscal position purged
of the estimated budgetary consequences of the business cycle, and is designed in part to provide an
indication of the medium-term orientation of fiscal policy“ (Hagemann, 1999, p.1). 
Box 6: Structural budget balance in EU
Following the EU fiscal model, the structural budget balance or the cyclically adjusted balance (CAB)
is established as:
CAB=( B
Y
)−CC (3.3)
where B/Y is the nominal budget balance to GDP ratio and CC the cyclical components. It is therefore
important to correctly establish the cyclical components in order to exclude it from budget balance so
as to maintain a medium-term fiscal stability of the country. By definition, the cyclical component is
“that part of the change in the budget balance that follows automatically from the cyclical conditions
of the economy, due to the reaction of public revenue and expenditure to changes in the output gap“
(European Commission web glossary). The CC determination is therefore based on the measurement
of output gap (OG, or cyclical position of the economy) and on the “cyclical-adjustment budgetary
parameter“ (tax elasticity ε , or the link between economic cycle and budget balance). Important
critiques concerning these two parameters are made; problems in the output gap measurement (GDP
updates within a cycle and changes in forecast) and difficulty in determining the correct “cyclical-
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adjustment budgetary parameters“ due to its short-term fluctuations. The cyclical components are the
results of the multiplication of these two components, algebraically:
CC=ε .OG (3.4)
After a correct calculation of cyclical components, the latter be will subtracted from annual budget in
order to achieve an appropriate cyclically-adjusted budget balance.
Considering the deviation of actual from potential output, and the sensibility of public revenues and
expenditures to these deviations, makes it possible to estimate the cyclical component of the budget
balance. If the latter are subtracted from the current budget balance, we can obtain a good estimation
of the structural budget balance (SBB). 
The SBB structure is based on potential output estimation which is determined with the “Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) time-series filtering method“. The HP method provides an “estimation of a trend line
around which the deviations of actual from trend output are symmetric over the complete business
cycle“ (Hagemann, 1999, p.4). This procedure, used by the European Commission, allows obtaining
potential output estimation though it presents problem of asymmetry in the extremes of time series. 
In conclusion, the CAB methodology is used in the EU and in most of OECD countries to oversee the
fiscal policy of member states, despite its negative aspect (possible errors in the cyclical components
estimation) (European Commission, 2013). In particular, these above-mentioned rules have positive
effects like an economic stabilisation function that allows reacting to the economic shocks with a
“compensation account“ made for temporary and one-off factors (account in which the accumulation
of temporary/one-off surplus in economic growth allows to compensate temporary/one-off deficits in
recession time). It is therefore important to clearly define the situations and factors benefitting from
these corrections account, in order to prevent abuse. In this subsection we will not get to the bottom of
this issue. The introduction of a budget balance rule in a cyclical-adjusted term allows therefore to
reduce the pro-cyclical problem thanks to the constitution of compensation account aiming to
cyclically stabilise the budget balance.  
Usually, structural budget balance rules are applied at local or regional government levels. For
example, advanced countries like Germany, Hungary and Switzerland have implemented this type of
fiscal rule. 
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3.1.3.3 Expenditure rules
The rules on public spending can also be used to reduce debt, although there is no direct link with debt
sustainability if any revenue constriction is established. In fact, an expenditure rule needs to be
supported by revenue or a balanced budget rule. In particular, they provide the ability to stabilise the
economy and limit the extent of government, affecting the amount of public resources. 
The expenditure rule is defined in two different ways: in nominal terms or in terms of expenditure-to-
GDP ratio (rarely observed in practice). In the first case, the expenditure rule is characterised by
counter-cyclicality, while the second can entail pro-cyclical bias (Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2012). Firstly,
counter-cyclicality is verified both in economic downturn and in economic growth. If in economic
downturn the inflation expectations diverge from the real measurements, or when the real inflation is
lower than the expected inflation, the nominal expenditure is larger than it should be (an higher
inflation entails an increase in amount of the nominal expenditures). This nominal expenditure
increase during economic slowdown operates counter-cyclically, inasmuch it consents with
macroeconomic stabilisation. This mechanism also works during economic growth, where the
expected inflation is lower than real inflation so as the nominal expenditure does not increase as
expected (following the real inflation) and so it decrease in value terms, causing a counter-cyclical
policy. The nominal targets have the advantage of being easily monitored and more transparent; in
addition, the exclusion of cyclical expenses allow to strengthen counter-cyclicality of such fiscal
policy (European Commission, 2012). 
For example in France, expenditure rule is applied to the central government and set limit of governmental
spending volume in nominal term (since 1998 and revisited in 2004 and 2011). In Sweden, the three-year nominal
expenditure ceiling (implemented in 2010) is applied to the central government and to pension system. The
swedish government is obliged to abide by expenditure limit set by three-years. 
Secondly, expenditure targets defined in real terms are less common because of the numerous and
difficult adjustments required to eliminate the inflation influence (price deflators depending on each
expenditure categories and on GDP deflator) in the medium-term perspective. This expenditure rule
has the same problem of pro-cyclicality as previously observed for debt and structural budget balance
rules. In particular, in periods of economic growth the expenditure amount tends to increase (because
of the economic expansion that increases the demand for public goods and services), preventing any
stabilisation or counter-cyclical policy. In times of recession,  important expenditure cuts are made in
order to ensure fiscal sustainability, so no kick-start or counter-cyclical policy is achievable. As a
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consequence, the pro-cyclicality bias of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio may jeopardise the sustainability
of the debt. 
For example, the expenditure-to-GDP rule has been implemented in Netherlands since 1994. The spending
limit covers three sectors: central government, social security and healthcare sector. Eventual expenditure
deviation from the target must be compensated within each specific sector through the use of windfall revenues. 
It is fundamental to exclude certain number of selected productive expenditures from expenditure
rules. This procedure allows to guarantee the quality of government finances even if its fiscal
discipline can be slightly reduced.This rule requires a medium term determination of public spending
priorities that influence politicians in their policy decision. The spending limit is determined by
referring to the total public finances. The decision on how to split this constraint in the different
departments or expenditure areas depends on the priority of a particular government. As previously
covered in the subchapter concerning the fiscal rule characteristics, some specific categories of
spending are not included in the coverage of the rule. First, the interest payments are excluded from
the target because they can not be fully controlled by the government. In fact, forecast errors like
under- or overestimation of interest payment can negatively or positively influence public spending,
therefore a primary expenditure target is preferred. Second, public investments are not to be included
in the expenditure target in order to favour growth-oriented spending categories, being alert to creative
accounting or reclassification of spending items made for circumventing the target. Third, cyclically
sensitive items (e.g. unemployment benefits) are not covered by the rule because of its non-
controllability in the short-run. These fluctuating items create additional and unwanted spending
reductions during a period. These three spending categories mentioned above are excluded from the
target in order to contain  potential negative effects derived from its inclusion. The negative impact of
this exclusion procedure is represented by a lowered link with debt sustainability, in fact the excluded
spending categories can register important deficits and consequently increase public debt.
The expenditure rule implemented in France since 1998, has been recently amended in order to increase its
effectiveness. In particular, since 2011 the interest payments on debt and the pensions for civil servants are
excluded from the spending rule applied to the central government. Also the swedish expenditure rule applied to
the central government (since 1997) excludes interest payments on debt from the target.
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As for the budget balance rule, in the case of expenditure target there are possible negative effects
concerning the expenditure composition as well. Potential changes in the expenditure composition can
modify the consistency of the government budgets balance and the population’s welfare. In fact, there
is danger for increased political pressure on less politically-sensitive categories of expenditure,
regardless of their productivity. The politicians are encouraged to increase spending in those
politically-sensitive categories (such as security and welfare expenditures, regardless of their
productivity) in order to take larger electoral advantages. Concerning less sensitive categories (such as
R&D, infrastructure and education), politicians have the tendency to decrease this spending amount in
favour of more visible projects. Moreover, Drazen and Eslava (2010) suggest an interesting argument
with the aim to explain changes in spending composition with the analysis of 46 US states data from
1977 to 2008. They argue that spending composition turns in favour of more “visible” projects like
social security, while education, health and transportation expenditures are classified as capital
expenditures and therefore “less visible” projects. 
3.1.3.4 Revenue rules
In this subchapter we analyse the mechanism of revenue rules, in particular we distinguish two
categories. First, the rules setting caps on tax burdens (preventing too high taxation) or establishing
minimum thresholds on revenue (providing adequate government grants). The main negative aspect of
this first category is represented by the potential pro-cyclical bias arising from the progressivity of tax
system. Progressivity of tax system is manifested when tax burden increases proportionally more than
tax base, indeed the tax base increment further raises the tax rate. Consequently, in a upturn period the
public revenue increases proportionally more than GDP growth, engendering pro-cyclicality of
revenue-to-GDP ceiling. No attitude towards macroeconomic stabilization is guaranteed because of the
pro-cyclicality of this rule. The second category concerns the use of windfall revenue derived from
economic and tax code changes. Indeed, tax revenues are directly affected by changes in economic
activity and then the notion of tax revenue elasticity to GDP ratio plays a central role. Tax elasticity is
defined as “a parameter measuring the relative change in tax revenues with respect to a relative change
in GDP“ (European commission, 2013; p. 209). In particular, the main tax revenue categories such as
income tax and value-added tax (VAT) have a tax elasticity close to one so they evolve in line with the
GDP growth, then they are not considered unexpected revenue. Instead of income tax and VAT, there
are windfall revenues (unforeseeable because of their higher and variable elasticity) that cannot be
used freely but only for debt reduction or for some special spending (established by a clear rule). In
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general, the windfall revenues are used to substantially reduce debt and deficit bias, so as to limit the
potential pro-cyclical issue (European Commission, 2012). In doing so, this rule allows to contain the
size of the public sector.
For example, since 2006 the french government adopted the revenue rule in order to regulate the allocation of
windfalls revenues. Every year the government decide ex-ante which part of the total windfalls revenue is used
to decrease public deficit. The same thing applies to Lithuania since 2008.
The monitoring of this rule depends on the existing structure of the tax system. If the latter is
safeguarded by a solid structure, it will be possible to monitor and verify the potential defaults in the
revenues. The exclusion of certain revenue categories from the rule causes a transparency and
credibility bias so as a change in the structure of tax system, reducing the effectiveness of this rule
(European Commission, 2012). In fact, if windfall revenues are not fully utilised in order to reduce
debt, the link with debt sustainability is reduced.
As discussed in the spending rule subchapter, even rules on revenue do not have a direct link with debt
sustainability, because no expenditure constraints are provided for. For these reasons the
implementation of revenue rules have to couple with other rules like expenditure rules or budget
balance rules (Hatchondo et al., 2012). 
3.1.3.5 Combination of different rules
After analysing the pros and cons of each fiscal rule, we verify a tendency for  the combination of
different regulations within a country. As we can see from the figure below, both emerging and
advanced countries showed a steady increase in the number of fiscal rules (Hatchondo et al., 2012).
Concerning the low-income countries (LICs), we observe an uncontroversial trend that is not relevant
in our analysis. 
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Figure 3: Average Number of National Fiscal Rules
Source: National authorities and IMF staff assessment
The supranational fiscal rules most used are the budget balance and debt rules, which are often
combined to allow a greater fiscal sustainability. Analysing the IMF’s statistic (figure below), we see
that the most frequently used combination is a debt rule accompanied by a budget balance rule. This
combination, chosen mainly from emerging and advanced countries, allows establishing a direct link
with debt sustainability. Furthermore it is easily monitored and communicated to the population and
politicians. Another alternative is represented by the combination of spending and budget balance
rules, as well as the combination of spending with debt rules. These two possibilities are not, however,
chosen so frequently by governments because of their low effectiveness.
Figure 4: Widespread Combinations of Fiscal Rules in Use (Number of Countries Combining
Two Rules), 2012
Source: National authorities and IMF staff assessment
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Note: BBR= budget balance rule; DR= debt rule; ER= expenditure rule, 1/ includes national and supranational rules
The differences in the fiscal rules choice depend on the economic structure of a country, which often
has different needs, financial capabilities and exposure to shocks. 
For example, an advanced economy prefers  "cyclically adjusted balances" because of the greater flexibility
and medium term fiscal policy perspectives. While emerging economies need a higher level of debt
coverage due to its high economic vulnerability, therefore politicians usually opt for an implementation of debt
rules. 
3.2 Testing the efficacy of fiscal rules on governmental performance: an european approach
In this subchapter we aim to verify the impact of fiscal rules on budgetary discipline in the European
Union. In  doing so we refer to a recent study that analyses the impact of fiscal rules on several
specific fiscal variables (e.g. fiscal balance, primary balance, governmental expenditures) through the
construction of a "Fiscal Rule Index" (Marneffe et al., 2011). After having analysed the Marneffe
(2011) study, the main econometric studies about the effectiveness of fiscal rule will be
illustrated(Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Wälti and Krogstrup, 2008; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010; Perotti,
2011; Iara and Wolff, 2011; Hatchondo et al., 2012). This allows having a precise and innovative
vision about the econometric impact of fiscal rules, providing some interesting mechanisms to
improve the efficiency of fiscal frameworks. Based on the period 1995-2008, the Marneffe's (2011)
study confirms a positive impact of fiscal rule on fiscal balance that was already shown by previous
research (Deroose et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008; European Commission, 2009). Before analysing
the econometric impact of fiscal rules, we will explain the construction of FR (Fiscal Rule Index)
methodology designed by the European Commission. In particular, the Directorate General for
Economic and Financial Affairs (DGECFIN) uses some strength indexes of fiscal rules, in order to
measure the influence of institutional structures on the application of certain fiscal rules. The
constraint of a rule is based on five variables characterising each national rule: (1) statutory base of the
rule, (2) surveillance institution, (3) nature of the enforcement system, (4) mechanism of application,
and (5) media visibility of the rule. Each characteristic is assigned a score according to a pre-defined
strength scale (0 if no rule is employed and maximum 5 if rules are very strong and well-implemented
according to IMF methodology). First, when the statutory base of the rule is guaranteed by law or by
constitution,  the rule is considered stronger (then an higher score is attributed, while a lower score is
given in case of no law or constitutional provision) in comparison to the rule based on political
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agreements or commitment. Second, when the surveillance institution is carried out by an independent
body (e.g. fiscal council, court of auditors, et.), the rule tends to be stronger and  respected more
(scores tend to 5 and 0 when surveillance isn't independent). Third, also the nature of enforcement
system is considered stronger when the institution is independent (independent institutions register a
score tending to 5, while 0 for dependent institution). Fourth, a stronger application mechanism of the
rule consists of automatic correction and the possibility of sanctions in case of non-compliance (scores
tend to 5 with the existence of correction and sanction mechanisms while tending to 0 in the opposite
case). Fifth, a large media visibility (scores tend to 5 when rule have a greater media visibility, while
to 0 in the opposite case) of the rule is intended to reinforce its effectiveness, inasmuch violation is
likely to trigger  public debate. The indices of strength obtained for each characteristic are aggregated
into a unique fiscal rule index (characterising each type of fiscal rule) and furthermore each specific
FR is combined to acquire a composite fiscal rule index per country per year. The “Random Weights
Technique“ used for this accumulation procedure, in order to obtain the “Fiscal Rule Index (FR)“ (see
Box 7) per country, is proposed by Sutherland (2005). 
Box 7: The random weights technique (OECD, 2006)
“Starting with low-level indicators, this technique uses 10 000 sets of randomly-generated weights to
calculate 10 000 overall indicators for each sub-central level of government. The random weights are
drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one and then normalised so as to sum to one.
This is equivalent to assuming complete uncertainty about the most appropriate value of each of the
individual weights used to construct the sub-index and overall composite indicator. Accordingly, the
resulting distribution of indicators for each sub-central level of government reflects the possible range
of values given no a priori information on the most appropriate value for each of the weights.
Confidence intervals and the probability of a given country achieving a given rank are calculated from
these distributions. The confidence intervals are centred on the mean value of each country’s 10 000
indicator values. Given that the weights are drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one,
the mean indicator values are asymptotically equivalent to indicators calculated using equal weights
on each of the low-level indicators“ (OECD, 2006; p.48). 
The FR index is therefore a sum of all the indices of strength within a country, weighted by the
coverage of governmental finances.
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In order to analyse the impact of FR on fiscal policy variables, a panel data regression is estimated as
follow:
FPi ,t=α+β0 FPi ,t−1+β2 FRi , t+X ' i , t γ+εi , t (3.5)
where FPt represents the fiscal policy variable as primary balance, primary government expenditures
and government revenue. FRt is the fiscal rule index while Xi,t is a vector of control variables
(economic control variables as lagged output gap, lagged debt level, natural logarithm of total
population, dependency ratio and inflation; political control variable as fragmentation of government,
ideology of governments measured on a left-center-right scale and years left in office). The Database
hails from the annual macro-economic database of European Commission's Directorate General for
Economic and Financial Affairs (AMECO) from 1990 until 2011. In particular, we refer to Table 1 for
analysing the effects of fiscal rules index on the primary balance, on primary governmental
expenditures and on governmental revenue. The first column of the panel data estimates represent
EMU countries, while the second is NON-EMU countries. In our analysis we will put the emphasis on
the FR influences in the EMU countries. Before examining FR impact, we verify a permanent
significance of few control variables (as lagged government debt, lagged output gap, population and
number of years left in office) regardless of public policy considered.
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Table 2: The effect of fiscal rules index on primary balance, primary government expenditures 
and government revenue
Note: The table reports one-step Arellano-Bond estimates of unbalanced dynamic panel data regressions
(1) with country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported within parentheses below each estimate.
Sargan is the test of overidentifying restrictions whereas AR(2) is a test of second order autocorrelation. Only
p-values are reported for these two tests. Source: Bergman et al. (2013)
Concerning the impact of the FR we confirm previous results from other studies (Ayuso-i-Casals et al.,
2008) which demonstrate a positive and significant influence on deficit and debt reduction. In fact, the
FR shows a positive and very significant effect on primary balance (0.466***), confirming the
effectiveness of fiscal rules in reducing deficit. The positive parameter, therefore,shows that EMU
countries with stricter fiscal rules measure generally larger primary surpluses, substantially improving
the country's fiscal discipline and reducing sovereign debt. The statistically FR significance is also
verified for government expenditures. The FR has a significant negative impact on primary
expenditures (- 0.698***), inasmuch the introduction of strict fiscal rule engender a restrictive effect
 	   Primary balance Primary expenditures Revenues 
 0.708*** 0.707*** 0.663*** 0.661*** 0.689*** 0.707*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.055) (0.057) 
 0.036*** 0.036*** -0.012* -0.015** 0.022*** 0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 -0.075*** -0.075*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.040** 0.039** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.017) 
Dependency -0.132** -0.134** 0.176*** 0.157*** 0.034 0.010 
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.054) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) 
Openness 0.904 0.909 -1.945** -1.896** -1.012 -0.908 
 (0.711) (0.716) (0.751) (0.740) (0.765) (0.720) 
Inflation 0.058** 0.058* -0.050 -0.049 0.016 0.017 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.034) (0.018) (0.016) 
Population -33.996*** -33.737*** 43.675*** 46.644*** 6.870* 9.292** 
 (9.394) (9.922) (9.915) (9.764) (4.089) (4.132) 
Ideology -0.140 -0.142 0.066 0.052 -0.074 -0.091 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.107) (0.100) (0.094) (0.093) 
Years left in office 0.205*** 0.205*** -0.106*** -0.110*** 0.096** 0.093* 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.040) (0.040) (0.048) (0.048) 
Government 
fragmentation -0.007 -0.007 0.006** 0.006** -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Opposition 
fragmentation 0.004 0.004 0.006*** 0.005* 0.010 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
 0.466*** 0.450*** -0.698*** -0.863*** -0.196 -0.358** 
 (0.134) (0.168) (0.162) (0.130) (0.210) (0.175) ×   0.052  0.514**  0.561** 
  (0.250)  (0.247)  (0.233) 
Sargan test 0.112 0.110 0.073 0.088 0.171 0.179 
AR(2) test 0.867 0.835 0.076 0.122 0.436 0.310 
 
FP
t-1
Debt
t-1
Gap
t-1
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on governmental expenditures. As previously analysed, the expenditures are directly controlled by
government, being an effective and immediate tool to slow the debt increase. Stricter FR are therefore
related to lower primary spending. Contrary to the primary balance and primary expenditures, the
impact of FRI on governmental revenue is not significant. In fact, we verify a slight decrease of
revenue due to the introduction of a fiscal rule (- 0.196) also if no significant effect is recorded.
With the help of an additional graph provided by European Commission (Figure 3), we perceive the
FRI diversity within the European Union in the period from 2000 to 2011. 
Figure 5: The EU Commission numerical Fiscal Rule Index in 2011 
Source: Bergman et al. (2013)
In particular, we verify that countries with higher fiscal rules index in 2011 are Sweden, Spain,
Bulgaria and Poland, while countries with lower fiscal rule index are Ireland, Cyprus, Greece and
Malta. In the case of Sweden, the high level of FR reveals sound and sustainable finances In fact the
most important reforms were implemented in 1997 (Expenditure rule) and 2000 (Budget balance rule),
substantially improving the governmental fiscal discipline (Schaechter et al., 2012). The case of Spain
is particular because the high level of FR in 2011 doesn't implicate sustainable fiscal policy. In effect,
despite greater fiscal rule index, the spanish debt-to-GDP increased substantially (since 2008)
recording 61.7% GDP in 2011 and even 93.9% GDP in 2014 (Trading Economics website). This
situation highlights the main problem behind the FR methodology: a greater index is not  synonymous
of  higher performance, as this indicator doesn't guarantee any real implementation of the rule. The FR
is considered a “quality index“ based on country specificities and doesn't verify whether the rules have
been implemented in practice (Bergman et al., 2013). Note that FR significance is not questioned.
Concerning Spain, in 2011-2012 were adopted new fiscal rules as expenditure, debt and budget
2000 2011
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balance rules in order to improve the country's solvency and adjust it to the EU standard (Schaechter et
al., 2012). These new fiscal reforms have increased the spanish FR value even though the country is in
transition times (rules are accepted but they take into force only in 2020). The FR level reached by
Bulgaria in 2011 is similar to the spanish index, although there is a substantial difference in the debt
level of these two countries. In fact, the Bulgarian debt-to-GDP ratio is 16.2% GDP confirming the
antecedent implementation of fiscal rules (in contrast with the spanish case) (Trading Economics
website).
Most of SWEAP (Southwest euro area periphery) countries (except for Spain) have a weak fiscal rules
index which remains substantially unvaried over years and indeed leads to problems on government
debt sustainability (Bergman et al., 2013). The FR evolution of such country's results are very limited
and insufficient compared to other EU's countries, requiring important fiscal reforms to consolidate
their unstable public finances. Looking at  figure 3 we can see how the fiscal rule index increased over
years in most of european members, while remaining quite stable in major underperformed countries.
This mechanism is accentuated by the fact that countries with better long-term sustainability are also
likely to carry out stricter fiscal rules, improving further the government fiscal stance (Bergman et al.,
2013). 
The construction of such an index can help the government assess when rules require an increasing
effectiveness; in fact if the FR is considered as a target or a benchmark, it can be easily observed when
deviations are recorded and when correction policies are needed (like in the case of SWEAP
countries).
The study conducted by Hatchondo (2012) furthermore shows the positive impact of fiscal rules on the
market value of bonds. The introduction of a fiscal rule (this study refers to a debt ceiling
implementation) lowers the debt level which causes an increase in the bonds’ value in favour of
creditors. This mechanism is throughly explained. The announcement of a future fiscal rule reduces
the interest rate on public debt, as lenders anticipate  greater governmental diligence that increases the
bond value (Hatchondo et al., 2012). The spread interest rate decline is related to the considered initial
spread level, in other words, the spread downturn is higher when the country is in low or normal
spread risk situation. This means, when country is in precarious situation (high spread level), the
investors have no credible anticipation about a greater fiscal discipline, significantly limiting the effect
on spread reduction subsequent to the rule announcement (Hatchondo et al., 2012). We have to
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consider that a higher reduction of spread level (caused by fiscal rule declaration) goes not necessarily
in favour of government; mostly increasing lenders capital gains. Therefore, it is needed to establish an
adequate transition time length so as to maximise the welfare gain of a rule introduction, establishing
an  balance between the possible capital gains (thanks to the higher bond value) and the cost needed
for fiscal adjustments for respecting the ceiling. The mechanism of spread reduction allows registering
a lower debt level compared to countries without fiscal rules. 
The econometric impact of national fiscal rules is therefore confirmed and highlights the existing
country's differences arising from diverse fiscal rules and from macroeconomic and regulatory local
conditions. As we have seen earlier, in some countries fiscal rules are more influential than others,
though it confirms a general positive and significant influence on the fiscal balance and on sovereign
default premium of a country. For example, the Swedish and  Bulgarian fiscal rule index is higher,
while SWEAP country (except for Spain) are characterised by lower index compared to other EU
members. 
Some high FR (as in the case of Spain) include large periods of transition (between the acceptance of a
rule and its actual implementation) that reduce their impact on budgetary outcome. Despite that, the
fiscal rules maintain a significative positive impact on primary budget balance and a significant
negative influence on primary expenditures. This link between national fiscal rules and budgetary
outcome is very significant and allows a considerable improvement of governmental finance. 
In countries where the national fiscal rules are not completely influential on the fiscal balance, it is
necessary to implement additional rules like supranational regulation. The main example of
supranational rule in the European Union is the Stability and Growth Pact. This mechanism allows
complementing and adapting the national fiscal rules to the European fiscal policy, ensuring a fiscal
discipline. The main policy challenge is that of being able to combine and coordinate national and
supranational rules, managing to maintain a high efficiency and stringency of both. The ceilings of
national and supranational rules have to be consistent and must not be in opposition between them. 
For ensuring an adequate effectiveness of national fiscal rules, it is important to make sure of the
consistency of subnational fiscal policy. In fact, subnational authorities have numerous incentives to
overspend, under-tax and borrow excessively, jeopardizing the central policy stringency. Therefore it
will be essential to set subnational rules in line with national rules, so as to assure the debt
sustainability. The question of the subnational rule will not be treated in this paper because it is a wide
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subject and requires additional considerations.  
Several studies show how the implementation of a fiscal rule allows an improvement in fiscal
discipline. Iara and Wolff (2011), who inspired the Hatchondo study (2012),  conclude early  that the
introduction of a national fiscal rule facilitates the containment of the governmental debt spread and
this positive effect can be expanded to the euro zone member countries. This influence will depend on
the specific characteristics of fiscal rules in a given country, as well as the global risk aversion. The
study of Wälti and Krogstrup (2008) conducted on Swiss cantons, confirms a significant impact of
fiscal rules. This study shows how the introduction of the variable "voter preference" does not question
the correlation between fiscal rules and the budget deficit, confirming the results obtained by previous
studies. In fact, with the consideration of "voter preference" the impact of a fiscal rule is slightly
reduced although remaining significantly positive. 
The effectiveness of fiscal rules is then recognized by different empirical studies even though there are
numerous strategies to circumvent them. Indeed, Alesina and Perotti (1996) consider different
techniques of creative accounting that allow circumventing the budget discipline. Furthermore,
Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010) carry out a study on OECD countries
affected by a massive reduction of debt. They demonstrate the positive impact of debt reduction (for
example through cuts in spending) on output and on private consumption. Perotti (2011) reconsiders
this argument, wondering if a short-term policy of fiscal consolidation (ever alluding to a cut
spending) has an expansionary effect or not. He points out that the actual situation has changed
compared to the past, in fact that if the current interest rates are very low and close to zero then the
default premium reduction becomes unattainable. He also criticizes the fact that thanks to sound
finance the net exports are expected to increase, noting that this cannot happen in countries highly
integrated with each other. This study concludes that the impact of fiscal policy consolidation results
still significant even if less influential compared to the past.
In conclusion, we note that the fiscal rule topic is very controversial and current. In fact many
econometric studies are presently treating this issue.
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3.3 The Swiss debt brake
This subchapter analyses the Swiss fiscal rules context, in particular referring to Swiss debt brake. The
latter was applied in 2003 to contain the increasing debt level during the 90’s. This rule has the
peculiarity of being anchored in the Federal Constitution, preventing any changing in law without a
popular vote. Thanks to the debt brake introduction, we record balanced budget over cycles, allowing
a greater fiscal discipline (it will be shown how in the Figure 4). The case study is about Switzerland
as it represents an interesting institutional laboratory and as it denotes a positive example in the world,
because of his high effectiveness in debt reduction and its  capacity to adapt to exceptional situations.
In fact, Switzerland is considered as an institutional laboratory inasmuch has a fiscal federalism
structure in which subnational levels (cantonal governments) have essential fiscal autonomies
regarding constitutional and/or statutory fiscal restraints. These cantonal differences constitute an
opportunity for studying the effect of different institutions on fiscal discipline within the same country.
In this subchapter, we will first explain the debt brake mechanisms and then its positive impact on
public finance and on swiss debt.  
Since the nineties, Switzerland has been characterised by a sharp increase of public debt due
principally to the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy (periods of growth were not used to consolidate public
finances but to increment spending) and due to the facilitated legal permissions for higher expenditure
(an increase of spending volume only requires  a simple majority of vote in parliament, while a raise of
revenue needs change in Swiss Constitution). A more detailed analysis of this period of debt
accumulation highlights the insufficient revenues or own funds in relation to the public expenditures
due to low economic growth, to several strategies for recapitalization and to financial aid for various
public companies, banks and pension funds. The 39% of additional debt (during the period between
1990 and 2005) was used to cover past deficit accumulation of financial account, while the 27.8% is
intended to finance public services like SBB, Post and RUAG, or for recovery of the pension funds
(DFF, 2006). In addition, the remaining debt is caused by treasury finance, as payments to Collective
Institution (like PUBLICA), or other public projects (FFA, 2006). The peak was reach in 2005, when
the federal gross debt was 130’339 million CHF and the debt ratio 27.2% of GDP (DFF, 2013). After
this period, we register a debt-decreasing trend, stimulated by an economic upturn and by
implementation of debt brake mechanism. In order to ensure sound public finances over the long term,
in 2001  85% of voters accepted the new fiscal rule known as The debt brake. 
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3.3.1 Mechanisms
The swiss debt brake is designed to maintain balanced public finances in the medium term (i.e. over a
business cycle) and to stabilise the sovereign gross debt. This debt brake mechanism is based on
Article 126 of the Swiss Federal Constitution (see annexe 1). Depending on the current economic
situation, deficits or surpluses are allowed in the short term or over a business cycle. The mechanism
of debt brake contributes to the implementation of "passive countercyclical" budgetary policy,
avoiding  engaging excessive expenditures during boom phases in order to prevent important cuts in
recession periods (FFA, 2012). In particular  article 126 of the swiss Constitution requires an
equilibrium between expenditures and revenues within an economic cycle. To achieve this goal, the
ceiling on total expenditures (to be approved in the budget) is set on estimated revenues considering
the economic situation. Therefore the implementation of this fiscal rule aim to limit expenditures to
the amount of structural revenues and envisage an annual government expenditure ceiling (is Ḡ  the
maximum level of expenditures) established as a function of revenues (R are the estimated revenue)
and position of the economy in the business cycle (k is the business cycle adjustment factor).
Algebraically:
 Ḡt=kt Rt where k t=
Y t
∗
Y t
(3.6)
and Y* is the predicted Trend-GDP and Y the predicted GDP. The business cycle adjustment aims to
stabilise the expenditure level, taking into account the level of cyclical-adjusted revenue represented
by the k factor and estimated using the HP filter methodology (previously explained in the course of
this thesis). The HP filter is used to correctly estimate a structural revenue trend in order to get stable
and appropriate expenditures. In particular, when the economy is below trend (k is larger than one),
deficits are allowed, while in case of growing economy (k smaller than one) budgetary surplus are
required. These deviations from the expenditure limit are credited (during economic expansion) or
debited (during recession) to a compensation account. Spending deviations from the debt brake limit
exist in the short term or within an economic cycle, allowing to accumulate surplus during growth in
order to compensate possible deficits in economic recession. In detail, in period of economic boom the
permitted expenditures have to be lower than forecasted revenue, ensuring important surplus deviated
to the compensation account, while in economic recession the permitted expenditures have to result in
bigger than forecasted revenue in order to boost the economy. The expenditure limits thus become
countercyclical. When deficits are bigger than 6% of annual expenditure limit, then the new
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expenditure ceiling for the following years have to be lowered in order to eliminate this excessive
spending within three years (FFA, 2012). This debt brake mechanism has the purpose of matching the
permitted expenditure level with the amount of estimated structural revenue, making public spending
independent from economic cycle fluctuations. The main problem is represented by the possible GDP
forecasting errors that influence both structural revenue estimation and cyclical adjustment factors. In
practice these estimation errors don't significantly influence the expenditure ceiling, as these errors
tend to be cancelled in the medium/long term (after 3-4 years the k factor tend to 1, or expenditures
tend to equalise to revenue). 
This Swiss model has the advantage of being highly credible, in fact the regulation envisage
provisions for exceptional circumstances in order to maintain the validity of the fiscal rule even during
periods of crisis or unexpected shocks. In other words, the political cost for abandoning this fiscal rule
during difficult periods is large enough to discourage its violation, maintaining its effectiveness over
the long term. 
Another characteristic of the debt brake rule is its application to the ordinary and extraordinary budget
(Economie Suisse, 2012). Furthermore, the swiss methodology does not distinguish between current
and investment expenditures, applying both categories to debt brake law. For obtaining extraordinary
expenditure or additional expenditure beyond the limit established by The Financial Budget Act, the
majority of both chambers' members of federal parliament have to accept the exceptional credit used to
counteract special and uncontrollable situations like natural disasters or economic shocks. These
extraordinary expenditures are debited to an “amortisation account“ and must generally be
compensated for during the following six years (established by “debt-brake extension“ of 2010), in
order to prevent abuse (OECD, 2011). Exceptions are made for some categories such as public
transport funds, infrastructure funds, social insurance funds or unemployment insurance, in fact these
classes are not subjects to the expenditure-limit established by the debt brake but to specific rules.
Another peculiarity of the Swiss system is that the debt brake applies only at the federal budget,
leaving the financial autonomy to cantons and municipalities. Each canton is responsible for its own
finances (as indicated by the Swiss Federal Constitution) and therefore is indicated to implement
specific fiscal rules to limit cantonal and local debt. This analysis of the relation between federal and
cantonal regulation will not be detailed in this thesis.
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3.3.2 Implications
The first and main implication of debt-brake rule is the positive effect on debt-to-GDP ratio. The
Swiss Government registered a remarkable reduction of debt-to-GDP after the implementation of debt
brake rule, fulfilling the objective of stabilising the national debt by the balance between expenditure
and income over an economic cycle. As we can observe from  Figure 4, with the debt-brake
implementation (particularly after the transition time, or since 2005) the gross debt and the debt-to-
GDP have recorded a steady decrease, extended to subsequent years.
Figure 6:  Gross Debt ratio of Swiss Confederation (1994-2014)	  
1990-2012: State account 2012 (in 27 March 2013); 2013: Estimation june 2013; 2014: Budget 2014 (in 21 August 2013); Last updater:
August 2013; Source: Federal Finance Administration FFA (2013) 
Since 2005 the debt-to-GDP ratio has become lower than 27% GDP and even below 20% GDP since
2009 (FFA, 2013). The principal difference between the nineties and the post-implementation debt-
brake years is the change from a pro-cyclical fiscal policy into a countercyclical budgetary policy. As
already explained, the nineties' growth was exploited to further increase expenditures, while since
2003 this mechanism was reversed. In fact, since the beginning of the 21st century the period of
growth acts to accumulate surplus in order to be able to compensate deficits during economic
slowdown. The combination of the strong growth and the debt brake rule allowed to register this fiscal
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
0.0 
5.0 
10.0 
15.0 
20.0 
25.0 
30.0 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
20
13
 
20
14
 
                                      E B 
 B
n 
CH
F
n
 
%
 G
DP
Gross debt (bn CHF) 
Debt ratio  (% GDP) 
47
stance improvement. The public debt decreasing is therefore not only attributed to the introduction of
this new fiscal rule but also to the strong economic growth context that has allowed accumulation of
surpluses to be deviated to the compensation account. The period from 2005 to 2013 is furthermore
characterized by a substantial decrease of unemployment rate and a growth of Swiss GDP. Although
the two shocks occurred in 2007, or rather the rise of petrol price and the increased volatility of
financial markets, the Swiss economic situation continues its positive evolution. During the subprime
crisis of 2008, we note that Switzerland was also affected by price fluctuations of raw materials and by
decreasing import/export, although the GDP evolution remains positive (+2.2%) and allows a constant
fiscal discipline (OFS, 2013). 
A small increase of gross debt and debt ratio is recorded during the period 2011-2012, as a result of
the European sovereign crisis that affects the whole economic world. In conclusion, we can observe a
general decreasing trend of gross debt (estimated110'300 billion CHF in 2014) and debt ratio
(estimated 17.9 % of GDP in 2014) in Switzerland. Based on the study conducted by the BNS (BNS,
2014), we can confirm a propagated trend to a decreasing gross debt and debt ratio in the subsequent
years (estimation provided until 2017) with some possible significant debt increase after 2018 due to
the increasing cost of social security as old-age insurance (FFA, 2012). The debt brake influence on
sovereign debt is hence calculated including the benefit of economic growth. Consequently, the
determination of the specific debt brake role results slightly overrated but still significantly positive
(FFA, 2014). 
Seeing that Swiss sovereign debt level is directly influenced by cantonal and local debts, we will also
deepen (in the following box) the effect of debt-brake implementation at the cantonal level.
Box 8: Cantonal debt-brake rule 
To cope with the increasing levels of deficit and debt, many Swiss cantons (since 80s) have
introduced fiscal rules, or cantonal debt brakes (subnational rules set independently from the national
government), with the aim of improving the sustainability of their public finances. Due to the high
fiscal autonomy charactering Swiss cantons, there are many remarkable differences in the stringency
of these fiscal rules between different time frames and different cantons. There are cantons with mid-
term balanced budgets or over the budget cycles, while others have annual ceilings. Moreover each
cantonal rule presents a different execution and sanction mechanism. 
Feld and Kirchgaessner (2008) studies the stringency of Swiss cantonal debt-brakes in order to
explain differences in fiscal discipline. In particular they construct a fiscal rule index (FR) for
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subnational level. The construction of such cantonal fiscal rule index considers three main
components: (i) the effective link between budget planning and actual budget execution (when this
connection is strong, the FR results strengthen), (ii) cantonal numerical constraints (when strong
numerical constraints are characterising the cantonal rule, then the FR is higher), (iii) effective
sanctions (if cantons implement automatic tax adjustment when the deficit ceiling is overstepped, then
the FR is higher) (Feld et al., 2012). For example cantons like Basle country, Fribourg, Neuchâtel,
Nidwalden, Schwyz, Vaud and Zurich have the automatic tax adjustment or when the deficit limit is
overstep, the cantonal tax rate is automatically adjusted in order to balance budget and severe
sanctions are also provided. If all the three components are fulfilled, the FR is the strongest and have a
score of “3”, while “0” if none of these requirements are present and hence the FR is weak. 
The figure above (Figure 7) shows the FR for swiss cantons. Cantons of Fribourg and St. Gall have
the most stringent and most stable (from 1980 to 2007) fiscal rules inasmuch all the three
requirements (previously treated) are fulfilled, having a FR equal to 3 (Feld et al., 2012). Concerning
cantons like Aargau, Berne, Lucerne, Neuchâtel, Solothurn and Valais, the FR equal to 2 or rather
only two characteristic are fulfilled. Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Grisons, Schwyz, Vaud and Zurich are
cantons with less stringent fiscal rule (FR equal to 1), while Basel-Country, Basel-Town, Geneva,
Thurgau and Ticino have not fiscal constraint in 2007. Except for Fribourg and St. Gallen, most
cantons have strengthened their fiscal rule especially since 2000s, like Lucerne, Berne and Zurich, or
even since 80s in Solothurn, Schwyz and Grisons. 
The impact of subnational fiscal rules on cantonal deficit and debt is significant, or the introduction of
strict fiscal rule aiming at balancing budget allow to improve the cantonal discipline (Feld et al.,
2012). Several studies conducted on swiss cantons (Feld et al., 2001; Feld et al. 2012; Kirchgaessner
2013) shows that cantons with more stringent fiscal rule register significantly lower levels of debt and
deficit (as showed from the high significance of fiscal constraint on cantonal deficit, see Annexe 2).
 Source: Feld and Kirchgässner (2008) 
49
Figure 7: Development of the Fiscal Rule Index 
The cantons Basel-Country, Basel-Town, Geneva, Ticino and Thurgau are excluded from the figure since they had no
fiscal rules in place over the regarded period. 
In conclusion, considering the period from 1980 to 2010, St. Gallen and Fribourg are cantons with
more stringent fiscal rule and because of that they have only modest nominal increase of their debt,
while Geneva (have no debt-brake till 2006) and Vaud (debt-brake implementation in 2005 and FR
equal to 1) are the cantons most indebted in Switzerland (Feld et al., 2012). 
The second implication of national debt brake introduction concerns the swiss budget process. With
this new fiscal regulation, the expenditure ceiling is determined at the beginning of the budget process,
being subsequently divided in expenditure target constraining each different ministry. This top-down
process (or aggregate level of expenditures) is in contrast with the previously methodology which
consisted in a bottom-up system, or in a bargaining within the coalition government in order to
establish a ceiling approved by the majority of ministers. This changing method allows the finance
minister to enforce easily responsible fiscal policy and to effective reduce public debt.
Third, after the debt brake rule introduction the expenditures have the tendency to become quite stable,
in fact any excessive fluctuations may endanger the government policy and the fulfilment of the rule.
Being the expenditures closely linked to revenue, any remarkable revenue fluctuation would cause an
adjustment of public spending, generating fiscal policy instability. 
Fourth, the budget quality can be jeopardised by the debt brake rule. In particular, with the
introduction of an expenditure ceiling the budget composition can change in favour of more expenses
with an higher political cost (spending categories with low political costs are more easily cuttable). In
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fact the debt brake rule aims to improve the swiss fiscal stance reducing public deficit and debt, not
ensuring a specific budget quality. Nevertheless, this fiscal rule aims to promote growth and welfare
policies over the long term, hence fundamental spending categories are maintained. 
3.3.3 Discussion
The swiss debt brake experience is considered a success as it contributed to significantly reducing the
sovereign debt. This success, however, is not attributable only to this debt-brake rule, but to the whole
fiscal system (including the subnational rules) and to the preceding rules like the "expenditure brake"
(introduced in 1995) or the "budget target 2001" (introduced in 1998). In addition, the rise of
economic growth favoured the increase of fiscal discipline and prepared the way for a debt brake
introduction (Geier et al., 2012). The swiss case highlights the inadequacy of discretionary policies
which doesn't follow strict rules but changes policy depending on economy. The implementation of a
credible and stringent rule like the debt-brake rule both to national and subnational levels show how
the fiscal policy stance is certainly improved. In fact, this methodology allows an effective budget
consolidation both in positive and negative economic conditions, following stabilisation objectives
over long time period and being flexible to unforeseen events. As demonstrated in recent financial
crisis, the debt brake method allows to maintain a stable discipline despite many economic difficulties.
Moreover, the reduction of debt burden and debt servicing costs have donated more available budget
resources to devote to spending categories like education and development. This demonstrates how the
budget quality is not reduced through debt-brake rules.  
Given the success of this fiscal rule, however, we must not underestimate future challenges as
demographic changes or structural lowering of GDP growth that may greatly influence the
mechanisms of debt brake and thus could put the rule under pressure. In conclusion, thanks to its solid
structure, the swiss debt brake results in an effective solution for implementing a correct fiscal
discipline. 
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4. Conclusion
This thesis address the problem of debt increases that characterised the European countries  since the
end of the 90s. At the beginning of the 2000s, several European countries were subject to excessive
deficit procedures manifesting an important governmental challenge for guaranteeing an adequate
fiscal discipline. This problematic issue is still present in to this day as evidenced by the high levels of
debt in the EU. It is a structural problem as shown from the negative primary structural balance hence
requiring a structural reform. In the 2000s national or supranational governments have attempted to
alleviate the problem by implementing diverse fiscal rules. This paper analysed different fiscal rules
such as debt and deficit rule, budget balance and structural budget balance rules, expenditure rules and
revenue rules. Such fiscal rules are implemented to ensure  fiscal discipline over the long-term, while
presenting different features and  obtaining different results. The debt and deficit rules have the
advantage of establishing a direct link to debt sustainability and are easy to communicate and monitor ,
despite its pro-cyclicality problem. The positive aspect of structural budget balance rule lies in its
economic stabilisation function that allows reacting to the economic shocks with a “compensation
account“ made for temporary and one-off factors. The expenditure rules have no direct link with debt
sustainability but they stabilise the economy if they are combined with revenue rules, therefore
limiting the fiscal deficit. This paper also shows the possible combinations of different fiscal rules,
proving its great effectiveness in debt reduction. 
The construction of the Fiscal Rule Index (proposed by the European Directorate General for
Economic and Financial Affairs) made it possible to econometrically measure the impact of a fiscal
rule on a country's debt and deficit level. Thanks to the analysis of different studies we could notice
that even if the impact of a fiscal rule is almost unanimously recognized, it  can vary according to each
considered study. Marneffe et al. (2011) empirically shows, through the construction of the FR index,
a positive rule impact on the fiscal balance, governmental spending and revenues. On the other hand,
Hatchondo et al. (2012) proves a positive influence of fiscal rules on the sovereign default premium.
In fact, in an economy without rules determining the fiscal discipline we note that the premium on
sovereign debt is higher. This mechanism is explained by the fact that the introduction of a fiscal rule
allows to influence the expected future sovereign debt, thereby reducing the interest rates at which the
government borrows. This reduction of borrowing allows obtaining a direct positive effect on the
sovereign debt. 
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Moreover, several economists prove the positive impact of fiscal rule on the governmental fiscal
balance as the case for the study of Iara and Wolff (2011) which demonstrates how national fiscal rule
facilitates the containment of the debt spread. Wälti and Krogstrup (2008) analyse the fiscal rules in
Swiss cantons, confirming a significant impact of fiscal rules on budget deficit, despite taking into
account the "voter preference" variable.
The topic of fiscal rules effectiveness has been studied by several economists who obtained similar
results. In fact the effectiveness of fiscal rules in improving fiscal discipline is unanimously recognised
even when Alesina and Perotti (1996) give attention to the different techniques of creative accounting
possible for circumventing the budget discipline of a rule. 
In conclusion, the debt increase trend forced the European Union and its Member states to restructure
its financial system, implementing fiscal rules reform on the supranational and national level. These
financial reforms have partially allowed for the restructure of discipline even if several countries are
faced with unsustainable or higher debt levels. In fact the Stability and Growth Pact have been
modified recently with the additional reform called “Two Pack Regulation“ (May 2013) in order to
quickly detect and durably correct excessive deficits of Member State. Given the effectiveness of
fiscal rules, it is not excluded that in the future we will increase these national and supranational
measures in order to prevent  future crises jeopardising the sustainability of a state.
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Annexe  
Annexe 1: Article 126 Financial management of Swiss Federal Constitution
1 The federal government shall maintain its income and expenditure in balance over time. 
2 The ceiling for total expenditure that is to be approved in the budget is based on the expected income
after taking account of the economic situation. 
3 Exceptional financial requirements may justify an appropriate increase in the ceiling in terms of
paragraph 2. The Federal Assembly shall decide on any increase in accordance with Article 159
paragraph 3c. 
4 If the total expenditure in the federal accounts exceeds the ceiling in terms of paragraphs 2 or 3,
compensation for this additional expenditure must be made in subsequent years. 
5 The details shall be regulated by law.
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Annexe 2: Cantonal Deficits and Debt per Capita
Source: Feld et al. (2006)
 
 Cantonal Deficits and Debts per Capita, 1980 - 1998 
dependent variable cantonal deficit  cantonal and local deficit 
log of  
cantonal debt 
constant -1726.722(*) 
(1.94) 
-2961.395* 
(2.53) 
20.478*** 
(5.20) 
direct democracy  -49.489 (0.82) 
-23.493 
(0.82) 
-0.123* 
(2.05) 
fiscal constraints -106.768*** (3.67) 
-109.545*** 
(2.96) 
-0.048 
(1.18) 
fiscal decentralisation -299.387 (0.85) 
24.694 
(0.06) 
-1.433*** 
(3.93) 
(log of) tax competition 617.461 (1.41) 
726.284 
(1.41) 
-0.267(*) 
(1.83) 
(log of) unconditional grants  -0.756** (2.82) 
-0.928** 
(2.72) 
-0.395** 
(2.92) 
ideology of the government 69.039 (0.43) 
110.891 
(0.56) 
0.109 
(0.52) 
(log of) disposable income 0.012* (2.13) 
0.014* 
(2.02) 
-0.587(*) 
(1.86) 
(log of) population 0.067 (0.52) 
0.100 
(0.63) 
-0.230*** 
(3.77) 
urbanisation 499.292* (2.23) 
591.414* 
(2.25) 
1.597*** 
(6.05) 
dummy for French and Italian language -313.814* (2.05) 
-528.718** 
(2.75) 
0.269 
(1.41) 
share of young population 52.883* (2.46) 
80.145** 
(3.01) 
-0.038 
(1.53) 
share of old population 37.062* (2.57) 
63.159*** 
(3.59) 
-0.042(*) 
(1.96) 
dummy for Appenzell Ausserrhoden in 
1996 
-3065.430*** 
(25.78) 
-3038.398*** 
(22.33) 
-0.273** 
(2.68) 
2R  0.489 0.478 0.633 
SER 348.798 433.530 0.310 
J.-B. 205.347*** 82.908*** 22.871*** 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the Newey-West 
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 0.1, 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. SER is the standard error of 
the regression, and J.-B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test for normality of the residuals.  
